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The Importance of Reference Prices in Decision Making:
An Application to Commodity Marketing
Market Report
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn,
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⃰ No Market

Year
Ago

146.67

4 Wks
Ago

4-24-15

163.11

158.63

*

277.73

284.70

*

218.88

229.80

231.91

246.04

259.20

115.42

57.61

64.57

116.27

67.78

67.83

146.00

145.67

137.67

374.46

367.44

361.53

7.11

6.19

4.52

4.85

3.69

3.51

14.78

9.29

9.45

8.52

7.41

7.41

4.48

3.14

2.76

190.00

200.00

190.00

115.00

77.50

72.50

102.50

105.00

120.00

235.00

172.50

178.00

68.00

55.50

58.00
+

When we are selling something, we evaluate market prices by comparing them to some reference
price that we have in mind. This comparison
gives us an idea of whether a certain price is
“good” or “bad”. For example, if I am a corn producer and had a chance to sell corn for $4.20/bu a
few months ago and now I can sell it only for
$3.50/bu, it might feel like the current price is
“bad” because I am comparing it with a higher
price that would have allowed me to make more
money. On the other hand, if my break-even price
is $3.40/bu, then it might feel like the current
price is “good” because I can still make a profit
by selling above my break-even level.
The distinction between “good” and “bad” prices
is often associated with the notion of gains and
losses. Selling corn at $3.50/bu when I could
have sold at $4.20/bu feels like a loss because I
missed the chance to make an extra $0.70/bu.
Conversely, selling at $3.50/bu can feel like a
gain since I am still receiving a price above my
break-even level. This discussion is important
because our behavior can change depending on
whether we are dealing with gains or losses.
Psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman were the first researchers who systematically
investigated how we make decisions based on
reference points and how our behavior changes as
we face gains or losses. Kahneman eventually
received the Nobel Prize in Economics for his
work in this area (Tversky was not considered for
the prize because he had already died). Their gen-
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eral findings can be illustrated by a simple, yet powerful, experiment (Table 1). Participants were asked to
choose between two investment strategies. First they
were given two strategies involving gains: in A they
would have a certain gain of $240, while in B they
could gain either $1,000 (25% probability) or nothing
(75% probability). The same participants were asked
to make similar choices in the second part of the experiment, but then Strategy A would give them a certain loss of $750, while in Strategy B they could lose
either $1,000 (75% probability) or nothing (25% probability).

the context of commodity marketing, this is particularly relevant because it can affect the timing of
marketing decisions. Going back to the initial example, if I focus on the price of $4.20/bu from a
few months ago, I might choose not to sell my
corn now because I feel I would be losing money.
But if I focus on my break-even of $3.40/bu, I
might decide to sell it now and guarantee a profit.
Do we actually focus on a specific piece of information or use a combination of information?

Table 1. Decision-making Experiment
Part 1: Investment decision involving gains

Part 2: Investment decision involving losses

Strategy A:

Strategy A:

sure gain of $240

Strategy B: 25% chance of making $1,000
75% chance of making nothing

This experiment, applied to different situations and
with some variations, was conducted with thousands
of people and often provided the same general result.
In Part 1, most participants would choose Strategy A,
a guaranteed sure gain. They would not be willing to
take the risk of making nothing for a chance to make
more money. On the other hand, in Part 2 most participants would choose Strategy B, indicating that they
would be willing to take more risks when facing losses. The majority of participants would prefer to take
the risk of losing even more money for a chance to
lose nothing.
These findings suggest that we tend to be more cautious when faced with gains and more prone to take
risks when faced with losses. In other words, we are
generally quick to guarantee a gain and reluctant to
accept a loss. As Amos Tversky put it, “It is not so
much that people hate uncertainty – but rather, they
hate losing”. Further developments from neuroscience
research have actually found that the human brain
processes financial losses in the same areas that respond to mortal danger.
Since we often make decisions by comparing possible
outcomes to reference points, and our behavior can
change according to our perception of gains and losses, it is important to identify how our reference points
are formed and how they may change over time. In

sure loss of $750

Strategy B: 75% chance of losing $1,000
25% chance of losing nothing

Jamie Poirier and I conducted a marketing simulation with 75 wheat farmers in Manitoba, Canada to explore these ideas. Farmers were asked to
make marketing decisions every month during
the marketing year (September to August). Each
month they could sell any quantity of wheat
(from zero to their whole crop), and they could
still store their grain after the end of the marketing year. In addition, in each month of the simulation, farmers were asked to indicate their price
expectation for the next month, the price at
which they would sell the rest of their wheat today (which we consider as “Reference Price 1”),
and the price at which they would sell the rest of
their wheat in the next month (which we consider as “Reference Price 2”).
Results from this marketing simulation showed
that farmers were eager to sell their grain when
the current market price was above their selfreported reference price, when the market was
going up and when they expected price to go
down in the following month. Conversely, they
were reluctant to sell their grain in the opposite
situations (Table 2). These findings are not surprising, but they suggest that reference prices are
relevant in marketing decisions. In the next part
of the analysis, we investigated how their reference prices were formed and updated over time.

Table 2. General Findings of our Marketing Experiment

Farmers were eager to sell when:

Farmers were reluctant to sell when:

(i) market price was above their reference
prices (feeling of gain)

(i) market price was below their reference
prices (feeling of loss)

(ii) market was in an uptrend

(ii) market was in an downtrend

(iii) they expected price to go down

(iii) they expected price to go up

Our analysis showed that their reference prices during
the simulation were positively correlated with four
pieces of information: highest price of the marketing
year, their price expectation for the next month, their
self-reported break-even price, and the current market
price. In particular, the highest price observed during
the marketing year had the strongest influence on their
reference prices. In addition, farmers would update
their reference prices based on changes in market prices during the marketing year and their price expectations for the following month. For example, they
would increase their reference prices when the market
was going up and they expected the market to go up in
the next month, and decrease them when the market
was going down and they expected the market to go
down in the next month. Interestingly, upward adjustments were twice as strong as downward adjustment,
i.e. farmers would quickly increase their reference
prices when the market was up, but slowly decrease
their reference prices when the market was down
(Figure 1).

corn farmer working on marketing my grain in a
scenario of downward prices. As I try to decide
when to sell my grain, I incorrectly calculate my
break-even price and end up overestimating it i.e.,
I believe it is higher than it really is. I keep focusing on the highest price of the marketing season
that was observed a few weeks ago, which, combined with my overestimated break-even price,
puts my reference price above the current market
price. Therefore, I will be reluctant to sell my
grain now. Further, although the market keeps
dropping, I incorrectly evaluate market conditions
and believe the price will go up in the near future,
which means I will reduce my reference price
very slowly as the market continues going down.
This scenario looks like the chart of the hypothetical downward market in Figure 1. As market
prices continue falling and I keep my reference
price relatively high, I will become even more
reluctant to sell my grain. Eventually, I will end
up selling at much lower prices compared to what
I could have sold.

Let us think about the implications of these results in a
marketing context using the following example. I am a

Figure 1: Example of Reference Price Adjustment When Market Is Up or Down

Two general lessons can be taken from this example.
First, it is fundamental to have appropriate information on relevant variables that affect our reference
prices and thus influence our marketing decisions. An
accurate calculation of break-even prices is an essential starting point. In addition, we need a good outlook
of commodity markets, which can obtained with different tools such as fundamental and technical analysis (Cornhusker Economics, 11/12/2014). Second, it is
important to have a plan that specifies carefully how
we should act under distinct market conditions. Having a clear and detailed strategy can help us avoid
“traps” such as focusing on the highest price of the
season and update reference price differently in upward and downward markets. Following these lessons
is not going to make marketing easy, but it can at least
help us make fewer mistakes. As it is often said in
sports, the winning team is the one that makes fewer
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